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Altruism has long been taken to be the guiding principle
of ethical organ donation in the UK, and has been used
as justiﬁcation for rejecting or allowing certain types of
donation. We argue that, despite this prominent role,
altruism has been poorly deﬁned in policy and position
documents, and used confusingly and inconsistently.
Looking at how the term has been used over recent
years allows us to deﬁne ‘organ donation altruism’, and
comparing this with accounts in the philosophical
literature highlights its theoretical shortcomings. The
recent report from the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics
reafﬁrmed the importance of altruism in organ donation,
and offered a clearer deﬁnition. This deﬁnition is,
however, more permissive than that of altruism
previously seen in UK policy, and as a result allows some
donations that previously have been considered
unacceptable. We argue that while altruistic motivation
may be desirable, it is not necessary.
BACKGROUND
That life-saving organ transplantation is a good
thing is fairly uncontroversial, but it relies upon a
supply of donated organs. Not all potential organ
donations are considered ethically acceptable,
however, and the reasons for donation have been
regarded as signiﬁcant in determining the overall
acceptability of particular donations (p.129).1
Suspect motivations in deceased organ donation
include proﬁt (ﬁnancial or otherwise)2 and seeking
to prevent speciﬁc recipients from beneﬁting or,
conversely, ensuring that they do.3 The apparent
absence of ‘altruistic’ motivation has been consid-
ered sufﬁcient to exclude donations that have con-
ditions or directions attached or involve any kind
of transaction,3 and for an otherwise potentially
lifesaving/enhancing donation to be rejected. The
Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics 2011 report (hence-
forth Nufﬁeld Report) emphasises the central pos-
ition of altruism in the UK:
Altruism, long promulgated as the only ethical
basis for donation of bodily material, should con-
tinue to play a central role in ethical thinking in
this ﬁeld. While some of the claims made for altru-
ism may be overblown, the notion of altruism as
underpinning important communal values
expresses something very signiﬁcant about the kind
of society in which we wish to live (p.5).4
Altruism is often referred to as one of the funda-
mental principles of transplantation (p.253,5, p.46)
but mostly without clear deﬁnition. Altruism can
refer to both motivation and action/practice.4 The
distinction between the two is the difference
between what motivates an action, behaviour or
practice and the actual outcome of that action,
behaviour or practice.
It is difﬁcult to determine in advance whether a
speciﬁc organ donation is an altruistic action
because while most recipients will beneﬁt from
their transplantation, if an organ is rejected or fails
the recipient may be worse off. Since altruistic
action/practice is judged on the basis of outcome it
is a poor guide to determining in advance of
surgery whether any particular offer of donation is
acceptable. Aside from this practical point, it is
clearly motivational altruism that is currently con-
sidered important in organ donation. What are of
concern to transplant authorities are the (altruistic)
reasons that motivate a donation, rather than the
contingent (altruistic) consequence (it is reasonable
to suppose that transplant surgery would not be
offered unless it was thought on balance to be of
beneﬁt to the recipient). It is therefore motivational
altruism that is the focus of this paper. As we shall
see, it may nonetheless be difﬁcult to be certain of
an individual’s motives. This paper, however,
explores the way in which altruistic motivation has
been, and could be, used as a guiding principle
when attempting to determine whether individual
offers of donation are acceptable.
The Nufﬁeld Report deﬁnes altruism as ‘entailing
a selﬂess gift to others without expectation of
remuneration’ (p.1204) and this deﬁnition is pro-
vided as though it were uncontroversial. There are,
however, long-standing philosophical debates over
whether altruism really exists, and if so, what it
means and how it manifests itself. Despite some
superﬁcial similarities, the term ‘altruism’ as used
in UK transplantation is quite different from the
mainstream views in philosophy, and has given rise
to a form of ‘organ donation altruism’ (ODA) that
has speciﬁc purposes and more limited scope. ODA
is used throughout this paper to refer to the
account of altruism seemingly endorsed by organ
donation policy and guidance in the UK. The
Nufﬁeld Report has repositioned altruism at the
forefront of organ donation and transplantation
ethics, so it is timely to reconsider what it means to
say ‘organ donation must be altruistic’.
Since the application of altruism results in the
rejection of potentially life-saving (and life-
enhancing) donations, a precise, rigorous and justi-
ﬁable deﬁnition is required. It will be argued that
the ODA account lacks the required precision and
rigour. Although the Nufﬁeld Report’s discussion
of altruism is arguably a step forward, it will be
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maintained that even it offers a severely restricted assessment
against which to measure potential donors’ motivations.
ALTRUISM AND THE GIFT OF LIFE
Organ donation has been described as the ‘gift of life’,7 and the
gift relationship has long underpinned organ donation systems.
Titmuss’s analysis of the gift relationship focused on blood
donation, and concluded that there were many advantages to
having a voluntary system based upon altruistic giving. Titmuss
acknowledges, however, that ‘no donor type can… be charac-
terised by complete, disinterested, spontaneous altruism’
(p.898). A problem with motivational altruism is that it is difﬁ-
cult (if not impossible) for transplant staff to establish the
motivation of donors. It may be easier to establish that some-
thing is not altruistically motivated than to decisively conclude
that it is; for instance, demanding reward for donating suggests
a non-altruistic motivation, but the mere absence of this sort of
demand does not mean that the donation is altruistically moti-
vated. Given this, the suitability of altruistic motivation as a fun-
damental requirement for acceptable organ donation is
immediately questionable.
ODA is sometimes taken to mean giving without expectation
of reward (ordinarily ﬁnancial reward).9 For example, regardless
of the legal position, trading in organs (from living/deceased
donors) has been rejected on the grounds that it is non-altruistic
(p.7410). ODA is sometimes taken to mean simply the opposite
of a commerce-based system (p.1311). Although ODA may have
started as a means of prohibiting organ trade, it has since been
used to determine the acceptability of other practices relating to
organ donation.
ALTRUISM AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Conditional and directed deceased donations are distinguished
from one another by the Human Tissue Authority, according to
which: ‘a condition would serve to exclude certain recipients; a
direction would identify one or more recipients’.12 Both sorts of
donation are generally prohibited. The incident that led to the
ban occurred in 1998 when a white man’s next of kin requested
his organs were only given to white people (p.13). A subsequent
Department of Health (DH) report speciﬁcally criticised this
donation for being non-altruistic (p.253). This suggests that
ODA entails more than just giving without anticipation of ﬁnan-
cial or other rewards, since there were no clear beneﬁts to the
donor or donor family that could not also apply to most, if not
all, deceased organ donation (some comfort for the bereaved,
sense of some good coming out of tragedy, etc). The relation-
ship between conditions and altruism was further reﬁned in
guidance issued in March 2010 in relation to requests for direc-
ted allocation of organs.13 The DH report 2000 states that condi-
tional donation offends against the ‘fundamental principle that
organs are donated altruistically and should go to patients in the
greatest need’ (p.253), whereas the 2010 guidance states that
conditional donation offends against the ‘fundamental principle
that organs are donated voluntarily and freely and should go to
patients according to the agreed criteria’ (p.413). This suggests
that for a deceased donation to be altruistic it must be donated
without coercion or constraints on who receives the organ.
Regarding conditional donations as non-altruistic suggests
that donation is only altruistic if it is without any constraints or
conditions. This is problematic though, because organs are
never donated absolutely freely and unconditionally; at the very
least organs are donated after death on the understanding that
they will be used for the purposes consented to (be it transplant-
ation or research). It therefore cannot be correct that the organs
must be donated absolutely unconditionally. The fact that
donors can choose whether their organs are used for transplant-
ation or research suggests that some constraints are considered
acceptable. In addition, the organ donor register permits poten-
tial donors to specify which organs they are willing to give,
implying that these organs will be given on condition that
others are not removed. All this suggests that constraints on
donations are only considered contrary to altruism if they fall
outside the parameters already deemed acceptable by reference
to other principles.
The objection to conditional deceased donation must go
deeper than the fact that conditional donations interfere with
traditional allocation models based on medical need and clinical
judgement, since the racial constraints in the 1998 case did not
alter the allocation. The recipients who topped the waiting lists
were all white and as such the conditions were met without dis-
advantaging any non-white recipients.14 Even so, the DH con-
cluded the donation was non-altruistic.
The ‘without constraint’ element of altruism employed here
appears to be linked to impartial allocation (where impartial
means ‘according to medical criteria’). This suggests that to be
altruistic, a donation must be motivated by a desire to help
other people in general, rather than a speciﬁc person or group
of people. This deﬁnition of altruism as impartial and undir-
ected runs into trouble when the 2010 guidance13 is explored
further. The guidance was issued following the case of a Laura
Ashworth.15 The ban on conditional and directed deceased
donations prevented her organs being donated to her mother
who needed a kidney transplant. Instead they were donated to
the general pool and allocated accordingly. Following public and
media reaction to this case, the March 2010 guidance was
issued speciﬁcally to permit the kinds of requests for directed
donation to family members in deceased donation that are
common in living donation. If, however, a decision to donate is
strongly motivated by a desire to help a speciﬁc family member,
this cannot be considered impartial. As though to anticipate this
objection, the guidance requires that deceased donation must
not be contingent upon the request being followed (p.413); so
in effect the donation is unconstrained and can still be consid-
ered altruistic in this sense. This understanding of altruism is
not consistently applied in living donation, where the vast
majority of donations are contingent upon the donated organ
being transplanted to a speciﬁc individual. It also contrasts with
altruism as understood by Nagel,16 which depends much more
heavily on rigorously applied impartiality.
PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF ALTRUISM
For Nagel altruism is ‘not to be confused with a generalised
affection for the human race’, and is instead ‘merely a willing-
ness to act in consideration of the interests of other persons,
without the need of ulterior motives’ (p.116). Nagel is interested
in the fundamental reasons for action and the possibility that
others’ interests can give one reasons to act. He argues that we
can have a direct reason to promote the interests of others (one
that does not ‘depend upon one’s own interests or antecedent
sentiments of sympathy and benevolence’ (p.1616)). For Nagel,
in order to act altruistically, the interests of others must provide
the reason for action, and this requires that one must consider
oneself to be just one person amongst many:
[i]n any situation in which there is reason for one person to
promote some end, we must be able to discover an end which
there is reason for anyone to promote, should he be in a position
to do so.” (p.9016)
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For Nagel, then, we can have a rational interest in helping
others regardless of things like sympathy or reward.
Accordingly, altruism must be objective and impartial, which
means that acting in the interests of a friend because he is a
friend is not altruistic. The sort of directed but unconditional
donation permitted in the 2010 guidance would not be altruistic
according to Nagel, because it would express unacceptable parti-
ality, as would directed living related donation.
Some partiality could, however, be accommodated in altruism
according to Blum, for whom ‘sympathy, compassion, concern
and care’ are ‘altruistic emotions’ (p.2617). These kinds of emo-
tions are central to altruistic behaviour because it is ‘good to be
sympathetic, compassionate, concerned, and caring for other
human beings’ (p.717). Often these sorts of emotions will be
most strongly felt towards family or friends, and Blum’s account
of altruism accommodates the partiality these relationships
might entail. Importantly, Blum does not argue that favouring
friends or family is always permissible and altruistic—merely
that it is acceptable to give some additional weight to their inter-
ests. Accordingly, Blum’s account would allow directed dona-
tions to count as altruistic in circumstances like those outlined
in the 2010 guidance.
Before we conclude that altruism in transplantation can be
likened to that justiﬁed by Blum we must consider how
living-related donation is differentiated from altruistic living
donation. The latter, sometimes referred to as ‘non-directed
altruistic living donation’,18 refers to cases where living indivi-
duals donate an organ—usually a kidney—or part of an organ,
ordinarily to be allocated according to the usual criteria applied
to deceased donation—that is, they are not donating to a spe-
ciﬁc known/loved individual. That altruism features in the name
of non-directed living donation, but not living-related donation,
suggests that organ donation is only considered altruistically
motivated if the organs are available for allocation to recipients
with whom the donor does not have a genetic or longstanding
personal relationship, which is contrary to Blum’s account.
Living-related donation could be considered with reference to
Miller’s account of altruism which distinguishes it from that
which we have an interest in doing or which we are obliged for
other reasons to do. For Miller, altruism is ‘behaviour that is
intended to meet the needs of others, where there is no immedi-
ate self-interested reason to help, and where there is no institu-
tional requirement that one should’ (p.10819). Just as feeding
one’s children would not be altruistic (p.10819), nor presumably
would giving them one’s kidney. Living-related donation would
not, therefore, be considered altruistically motivated even
though it is nonetheless acceptable.
Part of the problem for altruism in transplantation is that the
link between altruism and the ethical acceptability of something
is not always clear cut. Depending upon which account of altru-
ism one uses, altruism may suffer from what De Wispelaere calls
‘moral myopia’ (p.1720); altruism can tell us whether an act is
altruistic or not, but not always whether it is right or wrong,
especially when motives may be mixed. For instance, a person
may be motivated to donate partly by a desire to help people
and partly because her family disapproves. The relationship
between altruism and rightness is not a problem for Nagel’s
account which, owing to its strictly rational demands and
Kantian grounding, aligns altruistically motivated acts with right
acts. Blum’s account though, and the account apparently used in
transplantation, are more vulnerable to this criticism.
For example, imagine a walker passing a pool and seeing chil-
dren drowning. She jumps in and saves as many of the children
as she can but some drown. On the face of it this seems
altruistic and praiseworthy. But suppose the rescuer, calculating
that only three children could be saved in the time available, tar-
geted her own children. This would not be altruism according
to Nagel, since it expresses unacceptable partiality. It would also
not be altruism according to Miller, as one could argue that
parents have a responsibility to save their children. It could be
altruism according to Blum, if it was motivated by altruistic
emotions. It would also be altruism according to ODA, if the
mother would still have attempted to rescue other children if
she were unable to save her own. If, however, she had not been
prepared to save other children, and only ever intended to save
her own, she would not be altruistically motivated according to
the 2010 guidance.
This shows us that even taking competing philosophical deﬁ-
nitions into account, altruism as used to guide transplantation
practice is confused. If one does not have a relative on a trans-
plant waiting list, then one’s altruism must be impartial, much
like Nagel’s. This prevents people from directing organs in cases
like the racist donation in 1998, or from directing organs in
response to media-facilitated appeal by individuals.21 Yet if one
does have a relative on a transplant waiting list, then one’s altru-
ism can be partial and directed, more like Blum’s. Unlike the
2010 guidance, however, Blum does not insist that we must be
willing to follow through with an action even if our family
member cannot after all beneﬁt from it, but then neither does
usual practice in relation to living-related donation. Neither
Blum’s nor Nagel’s account is open to a ‘pick and mix’
approach: owing to their fundamentally different theoretical
groundings, one cannot endorse one while also endorsing the
other without contradiction.
If one were to adopt any of these philosophical accounts of
altruism as the basis for ethical organ donation, signiﬁcantly
more potential donations would have to be rejected. Nagel’s
altruism is particularly demanding, and would require the rejec-
tion of any organ not donated completely impartially. Seeking
to give meaning to the death of one’s loved one, being com-
forted in one’s bereavement, wanting to help particular kinds of
research efforts (like those trying to ﬁnd effective treatments for
the condition from which one’s loved one died), wanting to
save the life of one’s child/friend/partner, being moved by the
story of a particular patient and even fulﬁlling the wishes of the
deceased person would all be incompatible with Nagel’s altru-
ism and the organs would have to be rejected.
Blum’s altruism is still demanding, but in a different way
from Nagel’s. Where Nagel’s altruism is strictly rational, Blum
allows altruistic emotions to play a signiﬁcant role and would
potentially be compatible with donations directed towards
family and friends. It seems more likely that altruistic emotions
would exist towards family members than strangers, since one is
most likely to feel sympathy and compassion for those who one
cares most about. Moreover, although Blum’s altruism focuses
on altruistic emotions, it does not overly concern itself with
their origins; if a racist person felt altruistic emotions for
another person of his own race purely by virtue of their skin
colour, this could be compatible with Blum’s altruism. This
means that Blum’s altruism features the moral myopia described
De Wispelaere, as although a racist donation may be altruistic,
this does not make it ethical.
ALTRUISM AND THE NUFFIELD REPORT
The Nufﬁeld Report discusses altruism in detail, and presents a
distinctive account that has elements in common with ODA and
accounts found in philosophical literature. It deﬁnes altruism as
behaviour ‘that is motivated by concern for the welfare of the
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recipient of some beneﬁcent behaviour, rather than by concern
for the welfare of the person carrying out the action’ (p.1394). In
a departure from ODA, however, the recipient of the beneﬁcent
behaviour need not necessarily be the eventual organ recipient.
Much media attention was given to the Nufﬁeld Report’s pro-
posal to pay a donor’s funeral expenses and the claim that this
is compatible with altruism4 (Ch. 5 22). It argues that some
forms of reward may be compatible with altruistic intent, since
a single person may have a variety of motivations to donate
organs, one or more of which could be altruistic. Presumably
the authors would not endorse the claim that the presence of an
altruistic motivation amongst a number of distinctly non-
altruistic motivations (such as to deliberately spite family/
friends) would render the donation altruistically motivated.
Although there may be an altruistic element to a donation deci-
sion in this instance, it would seem incorrect to deduce from
this that the donation is altruistically motivated. Although they
acknowledge that real-life may present situations where motiva-
tions are mixed, the altruistic nature of a donation is secured
only when ‘concern for the welfare of others is a genuine motiv-
ator’ (p.1394). The difﬁculty here is that establishing motivation
is, as we have already discussed, notoriously difﬁcult and it was
perhaps beyond the scope of the Nufﬁeld Report to provide a
solution to this point.
Although the donor may be partly motivated to donate by his
funeral expenses being paid, he could do so with others’ inter-
ests in mind—he would receive no beneﬁt himself from his
funeral expenses being paid (he would be dead) but might be
trying to lift this ﬁnancial burden from his relatives. This,
according to the Nufﬁeld Report, is altruistic even though it dis-
plays a level of partiality (towards next-of-kin and relatives) that
is not ordinarily acceptable under ODA (p.1754).
By suggesting that altruism in organ donation might be directed
beyond the organ recipients, Nufﬁeld altruism could permit more
direct payments in exchange for donation—for instance, money
given to next-of-kin to spend as they wish. This would still be altru-
istic insofar as the donor would be motivated to donate organs in
order to beneﬁt other people; it just happens that the intended
beneﬁciaries would be his family. The only difference between the
two cases is how the money provided is to be spent.
A further complexity is the role of the next-of-kin in decisions
about deceased donation. The Nufﬁeld Report concedes that if
the next-of-kin agree to the donation only because they will
beneﬁt from the funeral expenses being paid, the payment of
funeral expenses in this case would be a ‘non-altruist focused
intervention’ (p.1394).
WHAT IS LEFT?
Table 1 illustrates how ODA compares with other accounts.
ODA acts as a guiding principle for determining and promoting
ethical donations, but features inconsistencies that result in
arbitrariness which, at the very least, border on unfairness to
those who are deprived of the beneﬁts of receiving an organ as
a result. Applying a philosophical deﬁnition of altruism would
be a remedy for this inconsistency but would result in many
fewer acceptable donations (Nagel), or additional principles
might be needed to identify donations that were undesirable for
reasons unrelated to altruism (Blum). Nufﬁeld altruism falls
between the two; it is consistent, and promotes organ donation,
but fails to provide a single guiding principle for determining
the acceptability of a donation. The Nufﬁeld Report accepts
however, that altruism cannot be the only guiding principle
(Ch 54). This is a sensible way forward for transplantation
ethics, since it allows unethical practice to be robustly and
roundly rejected without distorting a single principle (to the
extent that it becomes inconsistent) like altruism to suit a wide
range of speciﬁcs.
Nufﬁeld altruism is controversial, however, insofar as it seems
to permit practices that ODA was deliberately trying to prevent,
principally ﬁnancial incentives. Moreover, accepting that a deci-
sion to donate is unlikely to result from a single motivation, and
by widening the recipient pool for the other-regarding beneﬁcial
motivation that characterises altruism, the concept is virtually
redundant as a measure of whether a donation is acceptable. For
example, it would permit racial direction as a condition of
donation, as a person could still be motivated to donate by a
concern for the welfare of others, although that concern could
be conditional upon the recipients being of a certain race. Racist
conditions would only be discounted if it could be demonstrated
that the donor’s primary motivation was to deprive a particular
racial group of some beneﬁt (rather than to beneﬁt a different
group) and the deﬁnition of altruism was tightened so that only
primary motivations were assessed. The outstanding issue would
then remain whether it is ever possible to be certain what a
person’s motives are, let alone what their primary motives
might be.
IS DONOR ALTRUISM REALLY NECESSARY?
The Nufﬁeld Report provides us with one reason why we
should continue to associate organ donation with altruism: it
maintains the communal virtue of ‘a general disposition to be
moved to self-sacriﬁce by the health needs of others’ (p.1444).
In this sense, altruism in donation is more like a form of gener-
alised reciprocity (p.10919). People are urged to donate partly
to fulﬁl their desire to help others, but also because this will
promote the kind of community where others would do the
same for them. While it may be important that people are
moved to ‘self-sacriﬁce’ (p.1444) in order to help others, it is
not clear that the health needs of others ought to be the only
motivating factor. Also, the degree of self-sacriﬁce in deceased
organ donation is open to debate, and some people may not
view it as being a sacriﬁce at all. It is unlikely that under the
Table 1 Comparing accounts of altruism
Requirement ODA Nagel Blum Nuffield altruism
Impartiality Yes (unless one has a relative on a transplant
waiting list)
Yes No No
Unconditionality Yes No (a condition placed for objective reasons
could be permitted)
No No
Prohibits financial elements Yes No No No
Prohibits any self-interest or reward for donor No Yes No No
ODA, organ donation altruism.
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current system people are ‘moved to self-sacriﬁce’ purely by the
health needs of others; as the Nufﬁeld Report itself notes,
people donate organs for a number of reasons, some of which
may be selﬂess and other regarding, and others of which may be
more self-interested (ie, non-altruistic). The current NHS Blood
and Transplant ‘Prove it’ campaign seems designed to promote
reciprocity or fairness rather than altruism,23 which suggests
something of a retreat from altruism as the only acceptable
motivator. The 2011 NICE guidelines for organ donation do
not even mention altruism, and state that, similarly to other
documents,24 25 ‘organ donation should be considered as a
usual part of ‘end of life care’ planning’ (p.626). Making organ
donation ‘usual’ may make it ‘part and parcel’ (p.10919) of the
social role of dying people, and if this were the case, according
to Miller’s altruism, organ donation could not be altruistic—yet
NICE’s aim does not appear undesirable as a result.
We agree with the Nufﬁeld Report that a society where there
is a general disposition to altruism seems, on the face of it at
least, to be preferable to one where we are each only concerned
with our own interests. This does not, however, seem to justify
insisting that that altruism is a necessary as opposed to desirable
component of ethical donation. And, as we have shown, pro-
blems of arbitrary injustice seem to have arisen from an insist-
ence that it should be. The charade that donation must be
altruistic to be acceptable is revealed by the distinction between
‘altruistic living donation’ and ‘living-related donation’. The
latter has continued apace despite general recognition that there
are usually self-interested reasons for wanting to save the life of
a loved one. Perhaps it is time to accept that whilst altruism
might be a sign of an acceptable donation it is not the only sign.
These other signs may be used to preclude donations that (all
but Nagel’s deﬁnition of) altruism may accommodate, but
coherent, robust and consistent justiﬁcations are required every
time an offer of donation is declined because of the cost to the
recipients of rejecting offers of organs.
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